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1.  Who I Am and What I Do
The various thoughts I express in this paper are divided into five parts. I begin with a few 
brief comments about myself. I am a legal philosopher --- one of the few with a strong 
interest in drug policy. Not many philosophers are as interested in drug policy as I am, 
and none of them has been interested in it for as long as I. Surely the reason so few phi-
losophers specialize in this topic is because the issues are so empirical, and many philos-
ophers are notoriously allergic to facts. To have a deep interest in drug policy requires a 
willingness to wrestle with facts from many different disciplines --- sociology, political 
science, pharmacology, psychology, history, biology, economics, neuroscience and crimi-
nology, to name just a few. I am fascinated by what the foregoing disciplines contribute to 
the ongoing debate. But I have only scratched the surface. No one should profess to have a 
handle on all aspects of the massive puzzle that is drug policy. It is impossible to keep up. 
Drug policy is an enormous inter-disciplinary puzzle, and philosophy is only a tiny part 
of a piece. In much of this discussion I will draw from criminology in particular, because 
I have always believed it to be especially salient in the drug decriminalization debate. For 
better or worse, nearly all of my data comes from the United States---mostly from New 
York City, my current home---and I am unsure whether and to what extent the findings 
I’ll discuss can be generalized to other places in the United States, much less to Norway 
---where rates of drug use and violence have always been lower. But these data at least 
show us what is possible in the real world---a place where philosophers seldom tread.   
*        Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Rutgers University.
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 One noteworthy aspect of the debate about drug policy is that it invariably con-
cerns the criminalization of drugs. My focus is on this question too; I come to the topic 
from an interest in criminal law and criminal law theory more generally. But almost none 
of the literature focuses on the moral issue of whether or not persons should or should 
not use drugs. These two topics are similar, but different. It is certainly conceivable that 
the use of a given drug should be decriminalized even though that drug would be morally 
impermissible (and prudentially unwise) to use. Thus when I defend drug decriminaliza-
tion, I should not be misunderstood to recommend or endorse drug use. 
 So, much of the issue is empirical. Of course, many of these empirical findings are 
contested. But my view about the normative philosophical framework in which these al-
leged facts are situated has remained relatively unchanged for thirty years. Every now and 
then I learn something new philosophically as opposed to empirically, and I’ll mention 
one of these recent insights at the end of my presentation. After this little autobiography 
in part 1, I’ll talk in part 2 about drugs as a public health problem; mention in part 3 some 
empirical results that are germane to whether drug proscriptions can be justified because 
of their causal role in contributing to crime, hazard a few observations in part 4 about 
how a society should deal with drug problems, and say a few words in part 5 about the re-
cent opiate overdose epidemic plaguing much of the United States. My overall conclusion 
is that a good rationale for drug prohibitions has yet to be found, and the liberal alter-
native to criminalization, which recommends that drug use be treated as a public health 
problem, is problematic as well---even though it certainly would be an improvement on 
the status quo.   
2.  Drug Criminalization and Public Health1
Opinion surveys indicate that support for decriminalizing the use of some or all illicit 
drugs is at an all-time high throughout the United States.2 Outside of the special case of 
marijuana, however, almost no actual legal progress can be detected. The growing op-
position to our existing approach appears to be based on grounds of both principle and 
policy. As a matter of principle, hysteria about the dangers of drugs seems to have abat-
ed. The percentage of living citizens who have used an illicit drug at some point in their 
lives continues to rise and now represents a clear majority in the United States. Their 
personal experience confirms that illicit drug use per se is not sufficiently risky to merit 
1 Some of this material is drawn from Husak, Drugs, Crime, and Public Health: A Lesson from 
Criminology in Criminal Law, Philosophy, and Public Health Practice, eds.  Coggon, Kessel and 
Viens (Cambridge University Press 2013) p. 42.
2 CBS News: ‘Marijuana Legalization Support at All-Time High’ (20 April 2017), https://www.
cbsnews.com/news/support-for-marijuana-legalization-at-all-time-high/.
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the extreme punishments authorized by law.3 As a matter of policy, greater numbers of 
individuals regard our present approach as both ineffective and counterproductive. At 
home, drugs are easier to obtain now than when the war was declared. Internationally, 
efforts to curb supply have caused devastating consequences around the world.4 As state 
governments become starved for resources and painful cuts must be made, taxpayers 
question whether they are reaping a reasonable return for their ongoing investment in 
our punitive drug policy.
I deny that these punitive policies were ever defensible as a matter of justice.5 In a se-
ries of books and articles, I have argued that we should decriminalize the use of all illicit 
drugs.6 I reach this conclusion by applying general principles of criminalization. These 
principles must be satisfied if the enactment and enforcement of a penal statute is to be 
justified.7 In my hands, these principles take the form of constraints or necessary condi-
tions on the content of the substantive criminal law.8 Of course, the content of these prin-
ciples of criminalization is highly controversial. But commentators from all points along 
the political spectrum tend to agree that western countries and the United States in par-
ticular are guilty of overcriminalization---of punishing a broader range of conduct than 
should be allowed. We in the United States are notoriously guilty of over-punishment---of 
exceeding any reasonable proportionality constraints. In the case of drugs, I gather this 
is true in Norway as well. In the United States, Norway has a reputation for having what 
may be the world’s most enlightened and progressive system of penal justice. Yet the re-
gime of drug prohibitions represents a startling departure from this generalization. If we 
are serious about retarding the size and scope of the penal sanction, drug offenses would 
be a sensible place to begin almost anywhere.
Since theorists have reached no consensus about the meaning of such terms as legal-
ization or decriminalization,9 it is easy to misunderstand how my general views about 
3 Generally, see Robinson: ‘Crime and Punishment in New Jersey: The Criminal Code and Public 
Opinion on Sentencing’, http://www.drugpolicy.org/njcrime (2011).
4 See: ‘War on Drugs: Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy’ (June 2011). Available at 
www.globalcommissionondrugs.org.
5 It may be mistaken to assume, however, that drug policy is designed to reduce drug use. For an 
alternative rationale, see Husak, Drug Proscriptions as Proxy Crimes, 36 Law and Philosophy 345 
(2017).
6 See Husak, Drugs and Rights (Cambridge University Press 1992), Husak: Legalize This! (Verso 
2002) and Husak and de Marneffe, The Legalization of Drugs (Cambridge University Press 2005).
7 See Husak, Overcriminalization (Oxford University Press 2008). 
8 But see Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes (Oxford University Press 2016).
9 See Husak, Four Points About Drug Decriminalization, 22 Criminal Justice Ethics 21 (2003). 
In case my definition does not seem easy to misunderstand, it is noteworthy that what I call 
decriminalization in the context of illicit drugs is nearly identical to what is typically described 
as prohibition in the history of alcohol policy.  
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criminal law apply to drug policy. What I mean by proposals to decriminalize the use of 
a given drug is simple---deceptively so. I mean that the use (and possession for use) of 
that drug would not be a criminal offense. I take it to be a conceptual truth that offenses 
are criminal when they subject persons to state punishment. So anyone who thinks that 
the use of a given drug should be decriminalized believes that persons should not be 
punished merely for using it.  Decriminalization is not just de-incarceration; lots of pun-
ishments---by far the majority---do not involve imprisonment. Decriminalization means 
the end of all punishments, including fines and sentences of probation. Admittedly, this 
conclusion must be established drug-by-drug, and surely is more compelling for some 
drugs than for others. Still, I will ignore these important differences between drugs be-
cause I believe that the case in favor of punishing users of any existing drug fails to satisfy 
the normative criteria in our best theory of criminalization.      
So far, my thesis is wholly negative and leaves open the question: what should be done 
to illicit drug users? What I call the liberal position is to treat illicit drug use as a public 
health problem. Most Americans now embrace the liberal position. For the most part, 
commentators who adopt a public health approach to drug policy presuppose a frame-
work of harm-reduction. In this part I propose to comment on the liberal position as so 
construed. As an academic philosopher, however, I must proceed with caution. The great 
bulk of the literature on drugs and harm-reduction has been produced by social scien-
tists. These scholars are adept at empirical analysis, and we philosophers tread on their 
turf at our peril.  
Elsewhere I have been critical of the tendency to apply a harm-reduction perspec-
tive to all questions about drug policy.10 The cost-benefit, consequentialist framework 
of harm-reduction is notoriously indifferent to rights and to the deontological consid-
erations I believe to lie at the heart of many normative questions about punishment.11 
In addition, cost-benefit analyses tend to do a much better job quantifying the harms 
than the benefits of drug use.12 Once the benefits are identified, they are difficult to weigh 
against harms on a common scale to yield an overall balancing. Nonetheless, I have no 
special quarrel with a harm-reduction model in the present context. The issues I will dis-
cuss extend beyond decriminalization as I have defined it, which pertains only to drug 
10 See Husak, Competing Rationales for Drug Policy Reform in Drugs and Society, ed. Fish 
(Rowman & Littlefield 2006) p. 97.
11 Drug policy is dominated by a simple-minded utilitarianism that does not approach penal justice 
within a deontological framework. For example, recent commentators write ‘the plausibility of 
moving to a no-coercion drug policy depends on how much drug abuse current policies actually 
prevent’. Caulkins, Hawken and Kleiman,  Drugs and Drug Policy: What Everyone Needs to Know 
(Oxford University Press 2011) p. 19.
12 Kleiman and his co-authors at least raise the question of whether the pleasure caused by drug 
use counts as a benefit, but do not pursue the matter and stop short of trying to answer it. Id., p. 
138.
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use. A comprehensive policy should endeavor to describe how drug markets should be 
structured to produce sensible results. As inherently public institutions, markets are more 
subject to evaluation by the cost-benefit, consequentialist framework which I believe is 
incomplete when applied to questions about use itself.  
What exactly do liberals mean when they say that we should treat illicit drug use as 
a public health problem? They often mean (inter alia) that we should expand treatment 
for drug users. To many ears, pleas to expand the availability of treatment sound like an 
alternative to our punitive approach. But this proposal need not involve a retreat from 
our heavy reliance on criminal justice. Many thinkers regard the continuation of pun-
ishment for drug use as instrumental in ensuring the effectiveness of treatment and thus 
resist outright decriminalization. That is, they favor the retention of penal sanctions in 
order to increase the likelihood that persons will comply with treatment regimes, since 
the success of just about any type of treatment depends on the willingness of persons to 
cooperate with it. The proliferation of drug courts over the past two decades may seem to 
provide a perfect illustration of how criminal penalties can exist comfortably alongside 
a treatment regime.13 Although persons enter drug court through the coercive avenue of 
arrest, the rhetoric of these courts is solidly therapeutic rather than punitive. Thus drug 
courts may seem to involve a key component of a liberal, public health approach to drug 
use.  
After an early wave of positive reviews, more recent evidence indicates that drug 
courts are much less effective than their advocates had hoped in providing a viable public 
health approach to drug use.14 Many explanations can be given for the failure of drug 
courts to achieve their lofty aspirations, but the root of the problem, I believe, is that these 
courts are rooted firmly within a framework of criminal prohibitions for drug use.15 This 
framework creates several tensions; two are significant for present purposes.16 Firstly, 
drug problems are notoriously difficult to overcome; relapse among addicts is the rule 
rather than the exception. But abstinence is the ideological objective to which nearly all 
courts aspire. As a result, it is inevitable that a great many defendants fail to complete the 
treatment regime mandated and overseen by the drug court judge. Incarceration is the 
typical response to such failures. Often these persons are incarcerated for longer terms 
than would have been imposed had they accepted plea bargains and declined to enter 
13 The best monograph is Nolan Jr., Reinventing Justice: The American Drug Court Movement 
(Princeton University Press 2001).
14 See Husak, Retributivism, Proportionality, and the Challenge of the Drug Court Movement in 
Retributivism Has a Past. Has It a Future?, ed. Tonry (Oxford University Press 2011) p. 214.
15 See Boldt, A circumspect Look at Problem-Solving Courts in Problem-Solving Courts: Justice for 
the Twenty-First Century?, eds. Higgins and MacKinem (ABC-CLIO 2009).
16 For additional tensions, see Husak 2011 p. 214. 
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drug court in the first place.17 Secondly, the existence of drug courts produces a ‘net-wid-
ening’ effect. More users are arrested and prosecuted because well-intentioned officials 
believe such persons will benefit from the treatment drug courts offer.18 As a result of 
these two factors, the total amount of traditional punishments inflicted on users has al-
most certainly increased since drug courts have proliferated.19 This cannot be the out-
come drug court advocates intended.
  Of course, individual drug users should be permitted to experiment with most any 
mode of treatment they hope will be beneficial. I am skeptical, however, that liberals 
should coerce persons into treatment when they do not seek help voluntarily. I can only 
sketch my reservations here. First, as I have indicated, we must justify what is done to 
persons who fail to complete the treatment into which they are coerced. If punishments 
for use cannot be justified, they cannot be justified for use after individuals do not suc-
ceed in treatment. Second, despite enormous variation among providers, it is hard to be 
impressed by the drug treatment industry as a whole---whether or not it is overseen by a 
drug court judge.20 Treatment is usually expensive, often ineffective in the long run, and 
frequently unnecessary. Coercion for paternalistic purposes is hard to justify under the 
best of circumstances, and it is especially problematic when the benefit for the person 
coerced is uncertain.21 Astonishingly, addicts who undergo treatment are more likely to 
continue using drugs than those who do not enter treatment.22 In many respects, the drug 
treatment industry resembles the weight loss industry. The enormous resources expend-
ed on these treatments rarely produce lasting positive results. Despite billions of dollars 
expended annually, few treatment programs can boast of long-term success in getting 
patients to overcome their problems. As most dieters eventually regain their lost pounds, 
17 O’Hear, Rethinking Drug Courts: Restorative Justice as a Response to Racial Injustice, 20 
Stanford Law and Policy Review 463 (2009).
18 Hofman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 North Carolina Law Review 1437 (2001).
19 See Drug Policy Alliance: ‘Drug Courts are not the Answer: Toward a Health-Centered Approach 
to Drug Use’, available at www.drugpolicy.org.
20 Admittedly, practical and ideological reasons often prevent health care professionals from 
implementing ideas that may actually work. For a nice discussion, see Alessi, Petry and Rush, 
Contingency Management Treatments of Drug and Alcohol Use Disorders in Addiction and 
Responsibility, eds. Graham and Poland (MIT Press 2011) p. 225.
21 See Husak, Penal Paternalism in Paternalism: Theory and Practice, eds. Coons and Weber 
(Cambridge University Press 2013) p. 39.
22 ‘Berkson’s Bias’ provides a possible explanation of why addicts in treatment are less likely to stop 
using drugs, but the phenomenon continues to puzzle drug treatment researchers. According to 
one commentator, ‘the available evidence fails to support a pharmacological explanation of why 
addicts in treatment are less likely to quit using drugs … The most important [difference] is that 
addicts in treatment are much more likely to suffer from additional psychiatric disorders than those 
not in treatment’. Heyman, Addiction: A Disorder of Choice (Harvard University Press 2009) p. 
82.
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relapse rates of opiate addicts, for example, are as high as 90%. At the very least, any mea-
ger long-term benefits are purchased at an extraordinary cost.  
A basic problem is that coerced treatment probably is incompatible with decriminal-
ization as I construe it. Decriminalization precludes punishing drug users, and the ques-
tion of whether coerced treatment is consistent with decriminalization depends on how 
one understands the concept of punishment. Unfortunately, this issue is also unsettled, 
and confusion abounds. Many states (eighteen, depending on how one counts) in the 
United States have allegedly decriminalized marijuana possession, even though most of 
these states allow users to be ticketed and fined (rather than incarcerated).23 Of course, 
whether such arrangements are compatible with what I mean by decriminalization de-
pends on whether tickets and fines are modes of punishment rather than alternatives to 
punishment. Coerced treatment is vulnerable to the same uncertainty. I tend to think that 
both fines and coerced treatment are modes of punishment. Both intentionally impose 
stigmatizing deprivations, and thus satisfy what I regard as our best definition of punish-
ment.24 A fine for overtime parking of a vehicle, for example, may not stigmatize and may 
be designed simply to raise revenue and to ensure compliance with a fair scheme to allo-
cate a scarce resource (viz. the parking space). But no comparable story can be told about 
why persons who use or possess drugs should suffer a deprivation at all. Even though 
these modes of punishment are preferable to the more severe sanctions we now inflict on 
drug users, these sanctions are likely to be ruled out by decriminalization as defined here. 
In drug courts, as elsewhere, punishments and therapy are nearly impossible to recon-
cile. I am skeptical that criminalizing use is compatible with an acceptable public health 
approach to illicit drugs,25 and I am unimpressed by treatment regimes generally. Hope-
fully treatment will improve someday. In what follows, therefore, I explore a possible 
basis to contest my skepticism about drug criminalization that does not assume therapy 
is ineffective.  That is, I consider a reason that might justify punishing drug users in the 
pursuit of public health.
23 See, for example: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Places_that_have_decriminalized_non-medical_
cannabis_in_the_United_States.
24 See Husak 2008 pp. 92-93.
25 The devastating health consequences of punishing illicit drug users are described in detail by 
Drucker, A Plague of Prisons: The Epidemiology of Mass Incarceration in America (New Press 
2011).
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3.  Drugs and Crime: Findings from New York City
 With so many questions about the viability of a public health approach to a given issue, 
it is sensible to ask why illicit drugs are believed to present a public health problem in 
the first place. This inquiry is crucial if we hope to defend a public health approach to 
drug policy and assess its compatibility with criminalization. Obviously, this question has 
many different possible answers.26 I propose to focus on only one such answer, with no 
pretense that it is the most important. According to the possibility I will explore, the use 
of illicit drugs poses a public health problem because it causes violence. Since nearly all 
violence amounts to a crime, the hypothesis I will discuss is that the use of illicit drugs 
presents a public health problem because it causes violent crime. Some economic crimes 
should be included in this analysis. Even when they are not violent per se, the perpetra-
tion of economic crimes such as burglary increases the risk of violence and thus poses 
a problem for public health. Drug use, then, might jeopardize public health, albeit not 
necessarily the health of the drug user himself.      
 Social scientists have produced an enormous amount of literature investigating 
the alleged drug-crime connection.27 The most influential contribution to this topic was 
made quite some time ago by Paul Goldstein, who described three distinct mechanisms 
by which illicit drugs might cause crime.28 Drugs may cause psychopharmacological crime, 
somehow altering behavior and leading users to commit violent acts. Or drugs may cause 
economic crime, as users engage in shoplifting, theft, fraud, burglary, or robbery to obtain 
money to buy drugs.  Finally, drugs may cause systemic crime, as illicit markets generate 
a number of violent activities. Of course, drugs may cause crime through more indirect 
paths not mentioned by Goldstein. For example, drugs may worsen academic perfor-
mance or relax parental supervision of children, both factors that are linked to greater 
involvement in crime.29 In each of these categories, criminologists have debated whether 
drug use causes crime, whether crime causes drug use, or whether both have a common 
26 For efforts to estimate the consequences of illicit drug use on public health, see Allen, Crime, 
Drugs and Social Theory (Ashgate 2007); Bean, Drugs and Crime, 3rd ed. (Willan Publishing 
2008); Hammersley, Drugs and Crime (Polity Press 2008); and Stevens, Drugs, Crime and Public 
Health (Routledge-Cavendish 2011).
27 ‘The relationship between drug use and criminal activity has been extensively studied by social 
scientists, indeed perhaps more so than any other topic in the field’.  Faupel, Horowitz and Weaver, 
The Sociology of American Drug Use, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press 2010) p. 349.
28 Goldstein, The Drugs Violence Network: A Tripartite Conceptual Framework, 15 Journal of 
Drug Issues 493 (1985).
29 For a discussion of some of these complexities, see Natarajan (ed.), Drugs and Crime, Vol. II 
(Ashgate 2010).
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cause so that the relationship between the two is spurious.30 It may be presumptuous for 
a philosopher to attempt to add to this massive empirical literature. Despite my trepida-
tion, I hope to identify the normative significance of some recent criminological findings.
 An emphasis on the linkage between drugs and crime is eminently sensible for 
the normative purposes I pursue here. Punishments, as all philosophers agree, require 
a justification. How might we defend punishing persons for using illicit drugs? This 
practice cries out for a rationale. Surprisingly, a detailed and informed case in favor of 
criminalizing the use of illicit drugs has never been made.31 To where should readers be 
directed in the hope of finding such a rationale? In my judgment, the hypothesis that 
drugs substantially and unjustifiably increase the risk of violent crime constitutes the 
most promising of several possible justifications for imposing penal sanctions on drug 
users. Many of the alternative rationales that sometimes are heard---the supposition that 
drugs are unhealthy for the persons who use them, are deleterious to adolescents, or 
are just plain wrongful to consume---are more easily refuted.32 If drugs somehow cause 
an increase in the risk of violent crime, however, the case in favor of prohibition seems 
relatively secure. After all, the state has legitimately enacted a number of anticipatory or 
inchoate offenses. These offenses prohibit conduct not because of the harms they cause, 
but because of the harms they unjustifiably risk. If drug use unjustifiably risks violent 
crime, its proscription might be warranted by a similar rationale.33 Thus the present in-
quiry about the drug-crime nexus as a public health issue is directly relevant to the issue 
of criminalization---an investigation into what might justify our current practice of pun-
ishing drug users. A strong causal link between drugs and crime might make punishment 
of use compatible with a public health approach after all.
Regardless of how to understand the precise mechanism that explains the link, the 
hypothesis that drugs are strongly implicated in violent crime seems plausible. This hy-
pothesis is reinforced by data familiar to policy analysts. Studies consistently show both 
that drug users are much more involved in criminality than non-users, and that criminals 
are much more likely to use drugs than non-criminals.34 When the quantity of drugs 
30 Arguably, philosophers could make a genuine contribution to this issue by clarifying the concept 
of causation. Commentary on the drug-crime connection relies overwhelmingly on a simplistic 
counterfactual analysis according to which drug use is thought to cause crime if the latter would 
not have occurred but for the former. These analyses have been subjected to attacks. See Moore, 
Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics (Oxford University 
Press 2009) especially Chapter 4.
31 In fact, the topic gets surprisingly little attention. The most eloquent political philosophers of our 
generation who have earned a reputation for opposing injustice have been silent about whether 
drug criminalization is justified. I have in mind John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Joseph Raz, and 
Amartya Sen---to name a few.
32 See Husak 2002.
33 See Husak 2008 pp. 159-177.
34 The contested issue is why, not whether these correlations exist.
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consumed by heavy users is at its peak, rates of criminality among these users are greater 
as well. Moreover, estimates of the amount of property crime perpetrated by drug users 
range as high as 80%. In addition, interviews and blood tests of inmates typically reveal 
that more than half used an illicit drug in the month prior to the offense for which they 
are incarcerated, and nearly a third were under the influence of drugs at the time of their 
offense.35 Finally, broad statistical trends help to confirm the connection between drugs 
and crime. Rates of violent crime in the United States began to soar around 1985; this 
increase coincided with a spike in the sale and consumption of crack cocaine---which the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy then described as ‘the most dangerous and quickly 
addictive drug known to man’.36 
Nonetheless, researchers have expressed doubts about the supposed drug-crime con-
nection. One problem is the difficulty of specifying the mechanism that allegedly links 
drugs with violence. In particular, psychopharmacological explanations have proved 
stubbornly resistant to confirmation. Do drugs lead users to act violently because they 
compromise rationality or because they impair volition? Both possibilities have been con-
tested. Significantly, the effects of drugs in triggering violent behavior differ enormous-
ly from one individual to another in the same culture. In addition, the contribution of 
drugs to violence varies radically across cultures and appears to be learned,37 and which 
is most strongly confirmed in the case of alcohol. But here, as elsewhere, it is difficult 
to disentangle whether the behavioral effects of substances are a result of their intrinsic 
chemical properties or of other factors---most notably a result of cultural attitudes and 
legal regulations. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that drugs are bought and sold 
in illegal markets, where both buyers and sellers may be ignorant of the purity or quality 
of the substances they exchange.
How might we test the hypothesis that illicit drugs pose a public health problem be-
cause of their causal contribution to violent crime? No experiment that could actually be 
performed would be ethical. Still, some data that can be gathered in the real world would 
be suggestive. We might examine correlations between crime rates and drug use at dif-
ferent times in the same place, or in different places at the same time. In what follows, I 
discuss the former kind of test. If the hypothesis under investigation was true, we would 
expect (ceteris paribus) that an increase in the use of drugs in a given place would even-
tually lead to an increase in rates of violent crime, and that a decrease in the use of drugs 
in a given place would eventually lead to a decrease in rates of violent crime. If rates of 
violent crime dropped dramatically while drug use remained relatively constant, skepti-
35 See Faupel, Horowitz and Weaver 2010 p. 350.
36 Office of National Drug Control Policy 1989 p. 3.
37 See Fillmore and Vogel-Sprott, Learning, Expectancy, and Behavioral Control Implications 
for Drug Abuse in Associative Learning and Conditioning Theory, eds. Reilly and Schachtman 
(Oxford University Press 2011) p. 213.
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cism about the drug-crime connection would be warranted. As I will indicate, this latter 
combination of facts is exactly what has occurred in New York City in the past twenty 
years. Crime rates have plummeted throughout the largest city in the United States at 
the same time as the incidence of illicit drug use remained stable. In describing the data, 
I will draw heavily from a recent study by Frank Zimring that explores the spectacular 
crime drop in New York City during the past two decades and the role that drugs played 
(or did not play) in causing it.38
New York City provides a fascinating laboratory in which to examine the relation be-
tween drugs and crime. Although the occurrence of violent crime has dropped in nearly 
every city in the United States in the past generation, its decrease in New York has been 
especially precipitous. Even though crime rates have flattened or even inched up else-
where across the United States in the past few years, they continue to fall in our largest 
city.39 Zimring himself characterizes the New York crime drop as ‘astounding’.40 As he 
summarizes his findings: the magnitude of crime declines from peak rates ranges from 
63% to 94% with four of the seven  ‘index’ felonies showing a rate drop greater than 80%, 
and five of the seven over 75%. The most modest declines---theft and aggravated assault-
--drop by about two-thirds, while the rates of the other crimes decline to less than 20% 
of the city’s highest recent rates.
More detailed information, of course, is presented in his book. To be sure, doubts 
have been raised about the accuracy of this remarkable data.41 Nonetheless, statistics 
from independent sources confirm the magnitude of the crime drop. In short, something 
exceptional is happening in New York that should repay close attention.42 
It is worth noting that no respectable criminologist predicted that crime rates would 
fall to anywhere near their present levels. Theories about the causes of violence favored by 
social scientists from all points along the ideological spectrum suggested that crime could 
not possibly drop to its current lows. Some criminologists hold that demographics are the 
best predictors of crime rates. But the numbers of residents of New York aged 15 to 19 ---
38 Zimring, The City That Became Safe: New York’s Lessons for Urban Crime and Its Control (Oxford 
University Press 2011).
39 Crime appears to have increased slightly in several of New York City’s precincts since Zimring’s 
data were collected, but the uptick seems inconsequential unless it represents a trend. See Baker: 
‘Where Crime Is Up Across the Board, More Police but Not Many Jitters’, The New York Times 
(23 August 2011) p. A17.
40 Zimring 2011 p. 4.
41 Commentators sometimes complain that the numbers are inflated. But many of their allegations 
stem from frustrated New Yorkers who are disappointed by the fact that the police fail to record 
their reports of relatively minor crimes such as groping. See Baker and Goldstein: ‘Police Tactic: 
Keeping Crime Reports Off the Books’, New York Times (30 December 2011).
42 Something less exceptional is happening elsewhere in the nation. Throughout the entire country, 
crime has dropped while drug use has not. But the data indicate a more consistent and precipitous 
decline in New York City. See Zimring 2011 pp. 15-17 and pp. 35-43.
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the period of peak criminality---have risen by about 80,000 since 1990, from 470,000 to 
551,000. Nearly all of this increase took place in the racial and ethnic groups most prone 
to criminal activity.43 Other criminologists embrace economic theories of crime. Yet fluc-
tuations in poverty rates do not explain the data, and we have recently emerged from the 
greatest economic downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s.44 Most importantly 
for present purposes, many criminologists believe that drug consumption plays a crucial 
role in crime trends. Since few experts were willing to predict that the incidence of drug 
use would fall much below its nadir in 1992, rates of crime were expected to remain con-
stant at best. The collective failure of these demographic, economic, and substance abuse 
explanations of violent crime has inflicted a black eye on the profession of criminology. 
Zimring himself wonders why ‘there have been few attempts in either academic or policy 
discourse to conduct an extensive autopsy’ of the dire predictions of the early 1990s.45 He 
speculates that ‘the public and the political actors involved with policy are much more con-
cerned with what has caused a crime decline than with any negative lessons’.46 Although I 
am sure he is correct, it is crucial to appreciate that simplistic views about the drug-crime 
connection are undermined by empirical findings from New York City. These results are 
significant not only for understanding the nature of a public health approach to drug 
policy, but also for assessing the normative issue of drug criminalization itself.
The New York City crime drop is a monumental achievement that merits more pub-
licity and for which many persons deserve praise. Criminologists continue to be divided 
about the causes of this decline, and I have no original thoughts to contribute about 
this important topic.47 For present purposes, the most remarkable feature of this crime 
drop is that it has not been accompanied by a significant decrease in the incidence of 
illicit drug use. Reliable data on drug consumption is notoriously hard to obtain, but 
one preliminary point should generate agreement: The relevant datum to test a possible 
drug-crime connection is not the prevalence of illicit drug use per se. Overall figures on 
illicit drug trends are swamped by fluctuations in the consumption of marijuana, easily 
the most popular and widely available illicit substance. But no reasonable person believes 
43 Although the non-Hispanic Black population declined by 4.8%, the Hispanic youth cohort aged 
15-19 grew by 38%. Id., p. 84.
44 19.3% of New York City residents were below the poverty line in 1990; 21% were below in 2000, 
and 21.2% in 2010.  See Roberts: ‘As Effects of Recession Linger, Growth in City’s Poverty Rate 
Outpaces the Nation’s’, New York Times (22 September 2011) A23.
45 Zimring 2011 p. 88.  
46 Id.
47 Everyone loves to speculate about this matter. See the various opinions expressed in Blumstein 
and Wallman (eds.), The Crime Drop in America (Cambridge University Press 2000).
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that marijuana is directly implicated in violent crime.48 At best, its impact is indirect, that 
is, as a gateway to the use of other illicit drugs that are implicated in violent crime. Un-
questionably the data involving the so-called ‘hard drugs’---cocaine (in whatever form) 
and the opiates (especially heroin)---are more relevant for criminological purposes. New 
York City has long earned a reputation for housing cocaine and heroin users in far greater 
numbers than national averages. This fact was frequently cited to explain the high rates 
of violent crime throughout New York City in the 1980s, especially during the so-called 
crack epidemic. But how common are cocaine and heroin in New York City today? By 
all indications, cocaine use has been relatively flat while heroin use may recently have 
increased---although not nearly as rapidly as in most other cities in the United States. 
Zimring describes New York as ‘a city where drug violence drops by more than 90% while 
drug use is relatively stable’.49  
Of course, matters are not so simple. Despite its record-setting proportions, crime 
might have declined even further had illicit drug use been curbed. Or some other vari-
able(s) might explain why rates of violent crime have dropped dramatically even though 
the incidence of illicit drug use has remained constant. If some other factor accounts for 
the data, however, we would need a competing explanation for the surprising results. 
Among the many possible explanations, two must be rejected at the outset. First, New 
York has not managed to solve its crime problem by incarcerating large numbers of per-
sons---drug users or otherwise---who would be likely to perpetrate future offenses. Even 
though the incarceration rate has increased nationally since 1990, New York stands as a 
striking exception to this generalization. Not only is its overall prison population lower 
than in 1990, but New York City is locking up a smaller fraction of its population today 
than in the early and mid-1990s.50 Second, one pillar of what I have called the liberal 
position on drug policy should not be given much credence in explaining the statistics. 
No evidence indicates that significantly greater numbers of persons have received treat-
ment, or that those who have received treatment have succeeded in remaining abstinent, 
than in earlier times. Residents are managing to commit fewer crimes than in previous 
decades, but drug treatment providers should not take much credit for this achievement. 
Basic psychopharmacology has not changed. So what has changed in the nexus be-
tween drugs and violence during the spectacular crime drop of the past twenty years? No 
one factor can tell the whole story. But a major difference in this period is the manner in 
which drugs are bought and sold. Markets---in the sense of a public place where persons 
48 In the context of drugs, standards of what passes as reasonable vary radically over time. Harry 
Anslinger, U.S. Representative to the United Nations Narcotics Commission, remarked in 1962 
that ‘marijuana is the most violence-causing drug in the history of mankind’. Quoted in Plant et al., 
Drug Nation: Patterns, Problems, Panics, and Policies (Oxford University Press 2011) p. 129.
49 Id., p. 92.
50 Id., p. 88.
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go to buy a commodity---have been disrupted by intense police activity.51 Unlike the 
era in which markets would simply shift from one block or neighborhood to another, 
fewer drugs are exchanged in locations known to buyers and sellers---and, therefore, in 
locations known to the police. Technology has altered drug markets radically. Mobile 
phones are the most prevalent, but is not the only recent innovation playing a part in 
drug transactions. A cover story of The Village Voice in 2011, for example, described 
the active buying and selling of heroin on the Internet by using the craigslist website.52 
In any event, the noticeable erosion of open drug markets should not be confused with a 
decrease in drug consumption overall. Zimring observes ‘the New York experience may be 
an outstanding example of successful influence by the police on patters of drug trade without 
any much greater suppression of the drug traffic and use’.53 Although many details remain 
unclear, it seems that the nature of illicit drug markets, and not use itself, plays a more 
central role in explaining the drug-crime connection. Zimring concludes ‘the city may be 
winning its war on crime (and on drug violence) without winning the war on drug abuse’.54 
Again, caution must be urged. But if the issue with which we are concerned involves 
possible rationales for criminalization, it is important to be reminded that the burden of 
proof in making a case for punishment rests on the state.55 Maybe the above results can-
not be generalized beyond the particular case of New York City; no two cities are identi-
cal in all relevant respects. But the above findings cast so much doubt on the inevitability 
of a drug-crime nexus that we no longer should be confident that penal laws against drug 
use are needed for the purpose of preventing violent crime and preserving public health. 
4.  How Should the State and Social Institutions Respond to Illicit 
Drug Users?  
Suppose I am correct that illicit drug use need not create a serious public health problem 
because of its causal connection to violence generally or to violent crime in particular. 
Suppose further that this finding undermines the most credible argument for criminal-
izing the use of illicit drugs. Still, this conclusion remains wholly negative; it does not 
tell us what the state should do to illicit drug users. My own preference is simple---again, 
deceptively so. What the state should do to drug users depends on the type of state action 
involved. I believe that the criminal justice system should leave such persons alone. Again, 
51 In particular, Operation Pressure Point in Manhattan utilized 1,000 police officers for six months 
and made 17,000 felony arrests.
52 See Coscarelli and Shapiro: ‘Heroin.com: Selling Junk Online’, The Village Voice (20 April 2011).
53 Zimring 2011 p. 99.
54 Id., p. 99.
55 See Husak 2008.
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the claim that the criminal justice system should leave illicit drug users alone is easily 
misunderstood and becomes more plausible when clarified.  
Decriminalizing use per se does not preclude enacting specific laws that target times 
and places at which drug use creates elevated levels of risk to public health. Thus we 
mostly leave drinkers of alcohol alone, even though time and place restrictions are com-
mon and narrowly-tailored offenses (such as drunk driving) are enforced. But further 
options are also available; the state may adopt any number of devices to discourage drug 
use, as long as these devices are not accompanied by punishments.56 For example, no one 
should object to state efforts to promote healthy lifestyles and to educate persons about 
the hazards of illicit drugs. Even more importantly, institutions other than the state can 
and do play a significant role in discouraging drug use. After decriminalization, some of 
these institutions might exert even more influence. Private businesses, schools, insurance 
companies and universities, to cite just a few examples, might adopt policies that discrim-
inate against drug users. Suppose that employers fired workers and schools penalized 
students who consumed given drugs. I do not endorse all of these ideas; many seem 
unwise and destined to backfire. Removing drug users from schools or the workplace, 
for example, seems destined to increase their consumption. I simply point out that these 
practices are compatible with decriminalization as I construe it and can be accepted by 
those who believe the criminal justice system should leave drug users alone.  
The claim that the criminal justice system should leave drug users alone should not be 
understood to imply that these persons do not pose a significant social problem. Instead, 
the contention is that any coercive device the state might implement to combat these 
problems is likely to be ineffective, counterproductive, and/or unjust. This contention is 
not a priori or based on a libertarian ideology about the proper role of government.57 Any 
concrete proposal to employ a coercive state policy against drug use per se must be de-
scribed in detail and evaluated on its own merits. For the following reason, I am skeptical 
that any such idea will be persuasive. Approximately 125 million living residents in the 
United States have consumed an illicit drug at some time in their lives. In light of the fact 
that their use has caused no significant social problems in the vast majority of cases, any 
given proposal aimed at this behavior is bound to be overinclusive and to coerce partic-
ular individuals without justification. Consequentialists may be prepared to make these 
trade-offs, but any theorist who thinks our policy toward drug users should be governed 
by deontological constraints is likely to resist them.
Surely the most trenchant objection to my proposal is that coercive state efforts need 
to be retained in order to keep the incidence of drug use within acceptable limits. With-
56 See the strategies discussed in Bogart, Permit But Discourage: Regulating Excessive Consumption 
(Oxford University Press 2011).




out punitive state action, won’t rates of illicit drug use increase exponentially, with cor-
responding repercussions for public health? Some commentators deploy sophisticated 
models and hazard fairly specific predictions about how various policy changes would 
affect rates of consumption.58 To my mind, however, none of these predictions should be 
taken very seriously.  Since I have explained my reservations about the accuracy of these 
forecasts elsewhere, I will not recount the basis of my skepticism here.59  
In any event, misgivings about the empirical basis for predictions do not get to the 
heart of the matter. As I have emphasized, normative issues about punishment for the use 
of illicit drugs should be governed by deontological constraints, not by the utilitarian cal-
culus of harm-reduction. A criminal law is not justified simply because its absence would 
produce more disutility overall.60 Even on utilitarian grounds, the specter of greater use 
is not a trump card that may be played against any proposed policy reform. As harm-re-
duction theorists remind us, more drug use and more drug users need not translate into 
more drug-related harm. After all, no one should believe that drug consumption is intrin-
sically bad; it is bad, if at all, only because of its instrumental contribution to other evils. If 
illicit drug use plays less of an instrumental role in causing other evils than conventional 
wisdom supposes, we should question why the prospect of greater amounts of such use 
is viewed as an unmitigated disaster which no sensible commentator should tolerate. 
Again, there are many possible harms greater drug use might cause; each allegation must 
be studied separately and carefully. Drug policy presents a huge puzzle that, like most 
puzzles, is best approached one piece at a time. But if Zimring is correct about the recent 
experience of New York City, one of the most serious evils to which drug use has been 
thought to lead---violence generally and violent crime in particular----does not justify 
punitive policies against illicit drug users.
 
5.  The Current Opiate Overdose Epidemic
In my country, and probably most everywhere else, the details of drug policy often lurch 
from crisis to crisis. The most recent such crisis is the opiate epidemic. The number of 
deaths attributed to opiate overdose has skyrocketed in recent times, increasing more 
than four-fold in the past twenty years. Approximately 91 Americans die from an opiate 
58 See Kilmer et al.: ‘Altered States: Assessing How Marijuana Legalization in California Could 
Influence Marijuana Consumption and Public Budgets’, RAND Report Occasional Paper, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP315.html (2010). See also Donohue III, Ewing 
and Peloquin: ‘Rethinking America’s Illegal Drug Policy’, Working Paper 16776, National Bureau 
of Economic Research (February 2011), http://www.nber.org/tmp/88483-w16776.pdf.
59 See Husak, Predicting the Future: A Bad Reason to Criminalize Drug Use, Utah Law Review 105 
(2009).
60 See Husak 2008.
Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice • 1/2018
17
overdose every day, a number that exceeds the number of those killed by car accidents 
and by gun violence combined. Even worse, the epidemic shows no clear signs of abating. 
This latest crisis represents a national tragedy in health care with which the United States 
has rarely needed to cope.
 I have a reason for saying that 60,000 deaths are attributed to opiate overdose 
rather than directly caused by it. I urge caution not because I am especially skeptical of 
statistics that list opiates as implicated in a death. But the vast majority of these fatalities 
involve polydrug use, and the role of opiates as contrasted with the role of other substanc-
es, both licit and illicit, can be hard to disentangle. Moreover, a good many of these deaths 
involve contaminants or at least substances the user did not realize he was ingesting. 
Fentanyl, a powerful drug frequently used to tranquilize animals, is increasingly found in 
substances sold as heroin.
 Sociologists should profess a limited understanding of drug trends. They seem to 
have a life of their own. Like the ups and downs of the stock market, no one has succeed-
ed in predicting when they will start or when they are likely to end. Among the relative 
mysteries is the geographical distribution of a given epidemic. Although it is now spread-
ing more evenly throughout the country, the most recent wave of opiate overdose deaths 
began largely in poor and rural regions populated mostly by whites. Facile explanations 
do not explain this geographical fact. To be sure, unemployment and deprivation are high 
in these regions. But the economy of the places in which deaths are concentrated has 
been stagnant for a very long time before opiate use became so common.
 No one story describes what has happened to bring about the problem. Here, 
however, is what I believe to be the most plausible single explanation. Sensitive to alle-
gations that pain is undertreated by the medical profession, doctors began prescribing 
record numbers of synthetic opiates (e.g., OxyContin and Vicodin) to patients who were 
suffering or were likely to suffer. The amount of prescription opiates sold to pharmacies, 
hospitals, and doctor’s offices quadrupled from 1999 to 2010, despite the absence of ev-
idence that Americans were suffering more pain. In 2013, for example, providers wrote 
nearly a quarter of a billion opioid prescriptions---enough for every American adult to 
have his or her own bottle of pills. Patients rarely used the quantity of pills that were 
prescribed, but sold or stockpiled their reserves in medicine cabinets. Anyone interest-
ed in experimenting with a new drug had ready access to pills made available on the 
black market. At first, a great many users experience opiate use as incredibly euphoric. 
By 2014, nearly two million Americans were abusing prescription opioid pain relievers. 
Many because addicted, finding it very difficult to stop despite efforts to do so. As doctors 
were blamed for contributing to the epidemic, the number of prescriptions decreased 
and black market supplies dried up. As a result, many addicts turned to heroin---or what 
they believed to be heroin---as a substitute. In inflation-adjusted dollars, street heroin 
has never been cheaper in the United States. But deaths from (what users believe to be) 
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heroin are more frequent than deaths from synthetic opiates. As a result of this dynamic, 
the number of fatalities attributed to opiates continues to increase even while synthetic 
opiates are less widely available.61
 I cannot emphasize too strongly that the above scenario represents only one gen-
eralization that admits of countless exceptions. A minority of persons became addicted as 
a result of the very medications to which they were prescribed. Some (especially younger 
addicts) began directly with heroin and never touched a synthetic opiate. And so on. To 
my mind, among the most maddening aspects of drug policy in the United States is the 
supposition that individual variations are relatively unimportant and that generalizations 
about addicts and addiction apply uniformly throughout a given population. Commenta-
tors need to be more sensitive to the substantial differences among addicts, how they ex-
perience addiction, and what might be done to help them to overcome whatever problem 
they may have. In any event, the current opiate crisis has given rise to countless articles 
and exposes in the mainstream media.  A week does not pass without a great newspaper 
like the New York Times publishing a story about the epidemic. Unsurprisingly, attention 
is often directed to accounts of how local officials are struggling to deal with it. Many of 
their efforts are directed toward preventing addicts from dying. Throughout much of 
the United States, police and emergency medical technicians now carry naloxone, an 
antidote that reverses the otherwise lethal effects of an opiate overdose. In addition, gov-
ernment has cracked down on the indiscriminate prescribing of the pain medications 
that helped to cause the original problem. Moreover, treatment facilities are expanding 
all over the country. Like much else in the United States today, however, discussions of 
how to fund treatment facilities are highly politicized. One party is pilloried for devoting 
inadequate resources to the problem. Budget allocations of a ‘mere’ 45 billion dollars an-
nually are denounced as grossly insufficient to make a dent in the problem. But few ideas 
about how to actually reduce the opiate epidemic are floated in the media.
 As I have indicated, many liberals favor treatment as the best strategy to reduce 
the harm caused by addiction. As I have also indicated, however, real data about the suc-
cess of given forms of treatment are almost never made available---and for good reason. 
Before money is thrown at a given mode of treatment, hard evidence is needed that the 
plan is more effective in getting addicts to overcome their problem than only the resolve 
of addicts to quit without the assistance of anything we would describe as treatment. We 
should not jump upon the treatment bandwagon before we have reviewed evidence about 
how the many addicts who have succeeded in quitting have actually managed to do so. 
Quitting without anything we would categorize as treatment is remarkably common.62   
61 The statistics in this paragraph are from the U.S, Department of Health and Human Services: 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/index.html.
62 See Kelly et al., Prevalence and pathways of recovery from drug and alcohol problems in the United States 
population: Implications for practice, research, and policy, 181 Drug and Alcohol Dependence 162 (2017).
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 The increasing unavailability of black market synthetics cannot be expected to 
curb the opiate epidemic once addicts have made the transition from pharmaceuticals to 
street heroin. In fact, the substitution of street drugs for prescription medications proba-
bly compounds rather than alleviates the problem. In addition, suppose I am correct that 
nearly all treatment facilities are less efficacious than advertised. If so, what can be done 
to reverse the existing crisis? Indeed, few good ideas are on offer. Government advertise-
ments to publicize the horrors of addiction have not shown impressive results. School 
education programs appear to do as much harm as good. In a free society, we should be 
modest and realistic about what government officials or health care professionals can do 
about it. Unfortunately, even efforts motivated by the best of intentions have not pro-
duced great track records.   
 In light of the foregoing, it is disappointing that no prominent politician has open-
ly called for the decriminalization of opiate use. In fact, as I have indicated, the progress 
we have seen in reforming marijuana law throughout much of the country has virtually 
no parallel with any other controlled substance. How, one might ask, would decriminal-
ization be a solution?  The simple answer is that it is not. It is the default position to which 
we should gravitate when no reasonable solution exists. More to the point, however, de-
criminalization would reap some clear benefits. In particular, users and those who care 
for them would be far less reluctant to seek whatever formal or informal assistance might 
be helpful. The stigma of criminalization would be eroded. More importantly, legalized 
drugs would be subject to regulatory control and would not contain the contaminants 
and adulterants that now cause much of the problem. And most importantly of all, the 
prime beneficiaries of decriminalization would be the persons who presently suffer the 
hardships of punitive sanctions for their conduct.  
Before we despair and lose hope about what should be done, we should remind our-
selves of the history of past drug epidemics in the United States. For example, we should 
ask whatever happened to crack, once billed as the most devastating drug ever to hit the 
streets? Again, no single answer can begin to tell the complete story. But one prominent 
explanation is that many younger potential users were dissuaded from using crack after 
witnessing the destruction caused to their older relatives who were already hooked. Why 
would I want to wind up like my older brother, whose lifestyle is not something anyone 
(including himself) could ever admire or want to emulate? If this story is at all accurate, 
one would expect that the current heroin epidemic, like past drug epidemics in the Unit-
ed States, would wane on its own. I have no idea whether this forecast expresses pessi-
mism or optimism. But I predict that historians of the future will recount this forecast 
when the crisis has finally peaked and shown signs of significant decline.  
